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RECENT CASES
ing the specifically excluded views as having no relation to religion. Had the
court thereafter determined that Sisson's belief had some relation to religion,
even though minor, Sisson's belief would be within the congressional definition
of religion, Sisson could have been afforded exemption from the draft, and the
exemption's constitutionality would have been upheld. By utilizing such a
procedure, the court may have been able to avoid "imputing to Congress an
intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding
others, and [would have been] in accord with the well-established congressional
policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in
87
their religious tenets."
Because the Supreme Court may choose, on appeal, not to adopt the new
points of law developed in Sisson, the method the court chose to exempt Sisson
from the draft may have provided relief of a temporary nature only, and a
remedy which is tenuous at best. It is apparent, therefore, that the court should
have made an overt attempt to construe the provisions of section 6(j) of the
Act so as to include Sisson within the section's coverage. While it is true that
the court may have found that Sisson's convictions had no basis whatsoever in
religion, in making that determination alone the court would have made an
attempt to uphold the validity of the statute, and would have explored every
route available in fashioning its remedy.
DAVID A. HIGLEY

TAXATION-SriPENDs

GIVEN IN CONJUNCTION'WITH EMPLOYER

Doc-

TORAL PROGRAMS ARE TAxABLE AS COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYMENT

Respondents, Johnson, et. al.,' received stipends (which were originally
included in their gross income for the years 1961-1962) from their employer,
Westinghouse, while they were completing dissertations for doctoral degrees.
Such stipends constituted the second phase of a two-part program known as
the Westinghouse Bettis Fellowship and Doctoral Program.2 The payments
from Westinghouse were based on a specified percentage of respondents'
87. United States v. Seeger, 380 US. 163, 176 (1965).
1. Respondents were Richard E. Johnson, Richard A. Wolfe, and Martin L. Pomerantz,
all engineers at the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory and employed by Westinghouse. Their
wives were parties to the action merely because joint tax returns were filed for the years
in question.
2. This program was a two-phase schedule of subsidized post-graduate study in
engineering, physics, or mathematics. The first phase was a "work-study" concept with the
employee being paid for a forty-hour week and receiving up to eight hours off for the
purpose of attending classes. When an employee completed all preliminary requirements

for his doctorate he could apply for an educational leave of absence, which constituted the
second phase, to complete work on his doctoral dissertation. The employee was required
to submit a proposed dissertation topic for approval by Westinghouse and the Atomic

Energy Commission. Approval was based, inter alia, on a determination that the topic had
at least some general relevance to the work done at Bettis.
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prior salaries plus adders which depended upon individual family needs. While
on leave, the employees maintained seniority, received company benefits and
,submitted periodic progress reports relating to their dissertations. Furthermore, respondents signed a written agreement promising to return to the
employ of Westinghouse for a period of at least two years upon completion
of their studies.3 Upon returning, respondents were to "assume duties commensurate with their education and experience," at a salary "commensurate
with the duties assigned."14 Respondents filed income tax refund claims stating
that the stipends they had received were excludable from gross income as
"scholarships" or "fellowships" under section 117 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.5 These claims were rejected by the Commissioner and suit was
filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.6 There the jury was instructed to consider Treasury Regulation
section 1.117-4(c) 7 in reaching its verdict. This regulation provides that
amounts representing compensation for past, present, or future employment
services and amounts paid to an individual to enable him to pursue studies
or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor are not excludable from
gross income as scholarships or fellowships. The jury found that the amounts
were taxable income. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed, holding that Regulation section 1.117-4(c) was invalid, and that, as a matter of law, the amounts in question were "scholarships" excludable under section 117.8 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court of the United States.9 Held, Regulation section 1.117-4(c) was a valid
exercise of discretion given to the Treasury by Congress; the jury properly
found the amounts received by the respondents were taxable compensation
rather than excludable scholarships. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
Under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code' 0 there was no provision dealing expressly with the question of scholarship or fellowship grants. Determinations were basically made on a case-by-case method with the subjective
test of gift versus compensation being applied." The question was whether
the amounts received were of such character as to fall within the statutory
definition of gross income as amounts representing compensation for services
rendered, or were, on the other hand, to be considered as gifts to the recipients
3. The specific enforceability of this written agreement was strongly attacked by the
Court of Appeals. Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1968) (dictum).
4. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 744 (1969).
9. NT. REv. Con of 1954, § 117 [hereinafter cited as § 117].
6. Johnson v. Bingler, 47-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f1 9165 (D.C. W.D. Pa. 1966).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1956) [hereinafter cited as Reg. § 1.117-4(c)].
8. Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968).
9. Bingler v. Johnson, cert. granted, 393 U.S. 949 (1968).
10.

INT. R V. CODE of

1939.

11. I.T. 4056, 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 8 at 10. "If a grant or fellowship award is made
for 'the training and education of an individual, either as a part of his program in acquiring
a degree or in otherwise furthering his educational development, no services being rendered
as consideration therefor, the amount 'of the grant or award is a gift which is excludable
from gross income."
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and therefore, by definition, excluded from gross income.12 The consequence
of this method of determination was one of confusion for the taxpayer, the
Internal Revenue Service, and the courts. Congress sought to alleviate this
confusion by including section 117 in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1
It was Congress' intent that this section would provide "a clear-cut method
of distinguishing between taxable and non-taxable grants" and consequently
would eliminate decisions "on a case-by-case method."'14 Section 117(a) sets
out the general rule that gross income does not include amounts received as
scholarship or fellowship grants.15 A limitation placed on the general rule is
that degree candidates cannot exclude payments for services unless similar
services are required of all degree candidates regardless of whether they receive scholarships or fellowships. 16 While Congress did limit the exclusion. of
"scholarship" and "fellowship" grants, it never defined these terms. However,
as stated in Frank Thomas Bachmura,'7 Congress evidently felt these terms
had a commonly understood meaning since it failed to give them definitions
when enacting section 117. The Treasury attempted to remedy this lack of
definitiveness in its regulations. The Treasury Regulations define scholar-

ship as "an amount paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether
12. See George Winchester Stone, Jr., 23 T.C. 254 (1954); Ti Li Loo, 22 T.C. 220
(1954); Ephraim Banks and Libby K. Banks, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952).
13. For a comprehensive historical outline of § 117, see Mansfield, Income From Prizes
and Awards and From Scholarship and Fellowship Grants,N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX.

129 (1961).
14. H.R. Rep. No. 1382, 83d Cong.,

2d Sess. 17 (1954).
15.

2d Sess. 16 (1954); S.

Rep. No. 1662, 83d Cong.,

INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 117(a). Section 117(a) reads as follows:
§ 117. SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS.

(a)

GENMR

(b)

L; TATIONS.
MIVIUALS WHO ARE CADMATES ZOR DEGREES.

RULE.

In the case of an individual, gross income does not include(1) any amount received(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in section
151 (e)(4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed services and
accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only to the
extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
16. Id., § 117(b) (1) reads as follows:
(1)

In the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution (as defined in section 151(e) (4), subsection (a) shall not apply to that
portion of any amount received which represents payment for teaching, research,
or other services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to
receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other
services are required of all candidates (whether or not recipients of scholarships
or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree,
such teaching, research, or other services shall not be regarded as part-time employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
17. Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117, 1122 (1959).
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undergraduate or graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies."' 8
A fellowship is defined as "an amount paid to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or research."' 19 Of critical importance is Reg. section 1.117-4(c) which states in part that amounts paid as
compensation for services, whether past, present or future, are not scholarships or fellowships. 20 The interpretation of Reg. section 1.117-4(c) has
been the issue in much of the litigation concerning section 117.21
Since 1954, the situation with respect to the taxability of scholarships
and fellowships has remained as unsettled as it was prior to the enactment
of section 117. The Commissioner and the courts have persistently focused
on the intent of the grantor and, in determining this intent, have continued
to apply the pre-1954 test of gift versus compensation.2 2 However, Reg.
section 1.117-4(c) (2) has given rise to an additional test which has become
known as the "primary-purpose" test and has been used by a number of
the courts. 23 Under this test, even though a grant may be compensatory in
nature, it may still be a scholarship so long as its primary purpose is for the
benefit of the grantee.2 4 In other words, even though the stipend and its en18.

Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1956).

19. Id.

20.

Id., § 1.117-4(c) reads as follows:

The following . . . shall not be considered to be amounts received as a scholarship
or fellowship grant for the purposes of section 117:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the benefit of
the grantor.
(1) Except as piovided in § 1.117-2(a) [dealing with degree candidates and required services], any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to
enable him to pursue studies or research, if such amount represents either compensation for past, present, or future employment services or represents payment
for services which are subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor.
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him
to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor. However,
amounts paid or allowed to ... an individual to enable him to pursue studies or
research are considered to be amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship
grant for the purposes of section 117 if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the education and training of the recipient in his individual
capacity and the amount provided by the grantor does not represent compensation
or payment for the services described in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph.
Neither the fact that the recipient is required to furnish reports of his progress to
the grantor, nor the fact that the results of his studies or research may be of some
incidental benefit to the grantor, shall, of itself, be considered to destroy the
essential character of such amount as a scholarship or fellowship grant. [Emphasis added.]
21. Comment, 17 KAN. L. Rxv. 104, 108 (1968). See also Elmer L. Reese, Jr. and
Dorothy L. Reese, 45 T.C. 407 (1966); Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959).
22. See Gordon, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury
Policy, 1960 WASH. U. L.Q. 144.
23. See Wells v. Comm'n, 40 T.C. 40 (1963); Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582,
587 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Ussery]; Chandler P. B3halla, 35 T.C. 13, 17 (1960).
24. In Chandler P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 13, 17 (1960), the Court quoted with approval
from the brief filed on behalf of the Commissioner the following statement: "[Wjhether a
payment qualifies as a scholarship or fellowship grant excludable from gros income under
section 117 of the 1954 Code depends upon whether the primary purpose of the payment
is to further the education and training of the recipient or whether the primary purpose is
to serve the interest of the grantor." Also see Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D.
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suing results may give some benefit to the grantor, it is a scholarship so long
as the primary benefit flows to the recipient in his individual capacity. The
rulings and decisions under both tests have generally been adverse to the
taxpayer when his employer has been the payor of the alleged scholarship or
fellowship grant.25 Most of the rulings and decisions holding such "traineeemployees" taxable on the amount they receive have emphasized that these
persons render services which must be performed for the employer to carry
out its function. 26 Few of these cases give more than superficial attention to
the intent of, and benefit to, the recipient as is suggested by the primary
purpose test. As indicated by seemingly inconsistent decisions, 27 the enactment of section 117-and the ensuing Treasury Regulations has done little to
clarify an historically unsettled area of law. Reg. section 1.117-4(c), being
at the vortex of litigation regarding section 117, has been held to be both
valid and invalid with respect to Congressional intent.28 The Supreme Court
of the United States, in a case of first impression,2 9 attempted to clarify this
situation.
Johnson came to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals30 which
stated that Congress, in enacting section 117, intended to encourage financial
aid "to students at accredited schools and especially to candidates for degrees." 31 The Court of Appeals noted that the legislature desired "to do away
Pa. 1958); Wells v. Comm'r., 40 T.C. 40 (1963); Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117

(1959); Rev. Rul. 57-560, 1957-2 Cum. BuL., 108; Rev. Rul. 57-127, 1957-1 Cum. BULL.,
275; Rev. Rul. 56-419, 1956-2 Cum. ButL., 112.
25. Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966); Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C.
64 (1960); Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959). A notable exception occurred
in Ailene Evans, 34 T.C. 720 (1960). In the Evans case the Department of Mental Health
of the State of Tennessee paid a stipend to the taxpayer while she was enrolled in a
psychiatric nursing program at a university and the taxpayer agreed to accept employment
with the department after completing the course. The Tax Court, in holding that the
stipend was excludable, noted that the taxpayer would receive the prevailing salary for any
future services.
26. Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 (1960); Rev. Rul. 59-118 Cum. Butt. 1959-1, 41;
Rev. Rul. 57-386, Cumr. Butt_. 1957-2, 109; Rev. Rul. 56-101, Cum. BuLt. 1956-1, 89.
27. See, e.g., Ailene Evans, 34 T.C. 720 (1960) and Bronowitz v. Comm'r, P-H 1968
T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 68,221 (1968) as opposed to Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355
(6th Cir. 1966) and Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
28. Holding Reg. § 1.117-4(c) invalid were Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258, 260-61
(1968) and Bronowitz v. Comm'r, P-H 1968 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 68,211 (1968). Contra
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 751 (1969). See also Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d
355 (6th Cir. 1966) and Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961). In Ussery,

the court spedfically upheld Reg. § 1.117-4(c) and taxable monthly payments received by
an employee of the Mississippi Department of Public Welfare who had been given leave to
secure a Master's Degree in sodal work. The taxpayer there received employee benefits while
on leave, and was obligated to return to the department following completion of his studies.
Stewart involved a similar arrangement under which an employee of the Tennessee Department of Public Welfare received monthly stipends and other benefits during an educational
leave of absence but was required to return thereafter to her previous position.

29. Instant case.
30.

Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968). Mr. Justice Douglas dissented

from the Supreme Court's majority opinion for reasons given by the Court of Appeals.
Instant case at 758.
31. Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258, 260 (3d Cir. 1968).
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with the touchstone of compensation versus gift"8 2 and further, to provide
a clear cut manner for eliminating the necessity of determining the tax status
of grants "on a case-by-case method. 8 83 Urging a strict construction of section 117, the court took notice that only in the case of grantees who are not
candidates for degrees did the legislature specify that it desired "to tax those
grants which are in effect merely payments of a salary during a period when
the recipient is on leave from his regular job,"34 and that this concern was
specifically expressed in section 117(b)(2) by limiting the grantors that
could qualify and the amount which could be excluded. The court reasoned
further that, since Congress had imposed no restriction on the amount to be
excluded by a degree candidate, the canon of statutory construction expressio
unius exclusio ulterius 5- applied and, therefore, the "indicia of compensation
such as suggested by the Regulations [were not] legitimate criteria for taxing the excludability of an alleged scholarship." 36 The Court of Appeals determined that the facts, as shown, did not give rise to the assumption that
the payments were compensatory in nature, assuming, arguendo, that the
Regulations in question were within the legislative intent of section 117. The
Supreme Court, however, while describing its position as "fundamental doctrine," stated that as "contemporaneous constructions by those charged with
the administration of the Code, the Regulations must be sustained unless
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and should
not be overruled except for weighty reasons." 87 Using this rationale the Court
held that the Commissioner's Regulations merely supplied "the definitions [of
scholarship and fellowship] that Congress omitted," 38 and were a legitimate
exercise of prescribing "all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of the Internal Revenue Code." 39 Further, the definitions supplied by the
Regulation comport "with the ordinary understanding of 'scholarships' and
'fellowships' as relatively disinterested, 'no-strings' educational grants, with no
40
requirements of any substantial quid pro quo from the recipients.1 The Court
declared that the legislative intent in enacting section 117 was not "to exclude
from taxation all amounts, no matter how large or from what source, that are
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 259-60.
Id. n.9.
Id.
Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes

to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.
The Supreme Court dismissed the Third Circuit's reasoning on this point by stating that
such an interpretation could create great inequities and the Court declined "to assume that
Congress intended to sanction" such a situation. Instant case at 752.

36. Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258, 260 (3d Cir. 1968). Contra, Stewart v. United
States, 363 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1966).

37. Instant case at 750.

38. Id. at 749. While the Court of Appeals (in invalidating Reg. § 1.117-4) accepted
Evans and rejected Ussery and Stewart, the Supreme Court (in validating Reg. § 1.117-4)

endorsed the two latter cases by footnote (Id. n.30.) and stated that "we are informed by
the Solicitor General . .. that the Evans acquiescence will be modified." Id.
39. Id. at 751.
40. Id.
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given for the support of one who happens to be a student,"4' but merely that
scholarships and fellowships are sufficiently unique to merit tax treatment
separate from that accorded gifts. The Supreme Court held that the facts
clearly indicated that the payments were compensatory since the recipients
were receiving a quid for their quo, i.e., respondents were furnishing services,
both present and future, by virtue of their ongoing relationship and future employment with Westinghouse.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson has apparently re-established the
test of gift versus compensation as the method for determining whether a stipend is a scholarship or taxable income. The Court has singled out two significant facts to be considered: one, the intent of the donor, and two, whether
or not the stipend is in any way compensatory in nature vis-d-vis payment for
past, present, or future services. The Court's delineation of scholarships as
"relatively disinterested, 'no-strings' educational grants, with no requirements
of any substantial quid pro quo from the recipients" '42 sounds strikingly similar
to the language used in Commissioner v. Duberstein.4 There the Court defined
a gift as "detached and disinterested generosity" 44 and emphasized examination
of the transferor's intent. This use of the gift versus compensation test is
clearly contrary to legislative intent in enacting section 11745 in that this test
requires a case-by-case determination depending on the factual setting of each
situation. Moreover, the Court's construction of section 117 and Reg. section 1.117-4 has directly thwarted the Congressional intent of encouraging
scholarship aid. The Court in upholding the Regulations as valid has reached
a decision that does not comport with the clear national purpose behind section 117, i.e., to encourage scholarship aid and hence to encourage higher education of the populace. 46 The ramifications of this decision remain, of course,
to be seen. It would seem, however, that the Commissioner may now treat as
taxable income the vast majority of stipends that have been traditionally
treated as scholarships. Using the language of the Court regarding "no-strings
... with no requirements of any substantial quid pro quo from the recipients,"
the Commissioner might well label as taxable such stipends as National Collegiate Athletic Association scholarships and ordinary academic scholarships
41. Id. at 753 [emphasis added].
42. Id. at 751.
43. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
44. Id. at 285-86.
45. See text, p. 442, supra.
46. The Court's "reluctance to believe that § 117 was designed to exclude from taxation all amounts, no matter how large or from what source, that are given for the support of one who happens to be a student," is a case in point. Instant case at 753. The logic
of this statement is certainly questionable. The stipends in question were not given to
"one who happened to be a student," but rather, so that one might be a student, as is the
normal "scholarship incentive" offered by companies to their employees. However, in
upholding Reg. § 1.117-4(c) the Supreme Court seems to have held as valid not only that
language in Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1) which gives rise to the gift versus compensation test, but
also Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (2) from which the primary purpose test has been derived.
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based on one's prior and future academic performances. 47 In addition, the test
used by the Supreme Court may have the effect of discouraging the widespread
practice of governmental agencies and private corporations offering "scholarship
incentives" to encourage their employees to continue in their acquisition of
higher education degrees. It is highly improbable that any agency or corporate
enterprise would provide stipends to employees to pursue a course of study
alien to that entity's purpose for existence. 48 In the Court's opinion the intent
of the donor and whether or not the stipends are compensatory in nature would
seem to control. This is different from Reg. section 1.117-4(c)(2) which indicates that a stipend may be excludable even though compensatory in nature
so long as it is primarily for the benefit of the recipient in his individual capacity.49 Without legislative action giving more definite guidelines as to what a
scholarship is, the possibility exists that courts may interpret Johnson in such a
fashion as to maintain the primary purpose test. Such an interpretation may
result in decisions more in line with the original legislative intent of section 117.
The facts of Johnson are such that, using the primary purpose test, one may
still arrive at the ultimate conclusion that the stipends received by respondents
were taxable income. The jury in fact did consider Reg. section 1.117-4(c) (2)
by instruction and may well have reached their decision based on that subsection without relying on Reg. section 1.117-4(c) (1). One might make the argument that "substantial" quid pro quo (with emphasis on substantial) is necessary
for the language of Reg. section 1.117-4(c)(1)-gift versus compensation-to
take precedence over Reg. section 1.117-4(c) (2)-primary purpose test-as the
best method of determining whether a stipend is excludable from taxable income
as a scholarship or fellowship. If it were decided that the quid pro quo was not
"substantial" then the issue would be decided on whether or not the primary
purpose of the stipend was for the benefit of the recipient in his individual
capacity.
A. BRucE NORTON
47. The National Collegiate Athletic Association scholarships are given by member
universities and colleges to incoming "students" who are required to perform for the given
institution in their particular area of expertise, e.g., football, basketball, etc. If the students
fail to perform their specialties for reasons that are other than "valid" the institutions will
withdraw the "scholarship." This certainly would seem to qualify as a "substantial quid
pro quo." While an academic scholarship does not, at first glance, look to be a quid pro
quo situation, further study shows that an institution does receive a service from the "good"
academic students who receive these scholarships (and often lose them if their academic
work falls below better than average standards) in that the institution enhances its' academic standing and reputation by having such students in attendance. Active recruiting by
institutions for the excellent academic student is a fairly commonplace occurrence.
48. Such a program would enhance the chances of the entity losing the employee to
another entity in a field in which he obtained his higher education degree.
49. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2) has given rise to the primary purpose test. See notes 25-26
supra and accompanying text.

